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Abstract 
For a long time, gas has been the fuel that Hungary is particularly sensitive to in terms of security of 
energy supply; thus, gas diversification has become a key issue. However, along with the 2014 decision 
on the construction of new units at the Paks Nuclear Power Plant (Paks-2), the energy agenda has 
changed considerably. Paks-2 will have a decisive role in ensuring security of supply, and, in fact, it has 
already begun to perform a role in energy decisions. This paper aims to assess, on the one hand, the 
security of the stationary fuel supply in Hungary by applying the conventional three-dimensional 
approach, encompassing availability, affordability and sustainability, and, on the other, use our own gas 
diversification scheme to analyse the issue of gas diversification. We find that considerable progress has 
been made on gas diversification, and Paks-2 can also be included in our diversification scheme as a kind 
of sectoral diversification option. Prior to the Paks-2 decision, Hungary had followed an upward 
trajectory for its security of supply, despite certain negative developments. With Paks-2, Hungary’s 
dependence will both decrease and increase – as new types of risks emerge. There is great uncertainty 
about Hungary’s energy policies and security of supply, with the role of coal, gas and renewables in the 
energy/electricity mix still not settled. Their future is expected to be heavily dependent on political 
decisions rather than energy market factors, though energy market uncertainties are also high. 
JEL: L71, L95, O13, P28, Q4 
Keywords: Hungary, Russia, energy security, security of supply, gas diversification, coal, gas, nuclear 
energy, renewables 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Energy is the most important element of EU–Russia relations. In 2016, Russia 
provided the highest share of extra-EU imports of natural gas in gaseous state (46%), 
crude oil (32%) and coal (31%) (Eurostat, 2017a). Gas is the most sensitive issue, 
despite recent changes in European gas markets, and also despite the many years that 
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have passed since the 2009 Russian–Ukrainian gas crisis, which was the most serious 
gas supply security incident ever experienced in Europe and one of the most serious 
energy supply security incidents in general (Stern, 2009). This warning signal has 
prompted the EU countries to truly focus on security of supply and diversification, with 
the latter seen as a key to enhancing the former. The EU has taken several steps to do so, 
showing a gradual change in its approach to the issue. Since 2009, security 
considerations have gained prominence in official EU documents, despite maintaining 
explicit references to market integration, the liberal principle and related regulatory 
measures (Boersma and Goldthau, 2017: 103). Meanwhile, key developments have also 
taken place in geopolitics, and not just regarding Ukraine. However, the events in 
Ukraine in 2014 became a turning point. The conflict has changed the EU’s approach to 
energy policy and Russia. In recent years, the EU has come to see Russia as a growing 
threat. The plan of the Energy Union1 marks a fundamental shift from a liberal approach 
towards a liberal mercantilist one (Andersen et al., 2017). In contrast, the Hungarian 
government (2010–) considers Russian energy relations not as a threat but as an 
opportunity, and maintains increasingly closer ties with Russia. As part of this approach, 
in January 2014, Hungary concluded a huge nuclear deal with Russia, leading to Russia’s 
State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom participating in the design and construction 
of the future fifth and sixth units of the Paks Nuclear Power Plant (Paks-2). Thus, in 
addition to gas, another sensitive issue was added to the Hungarian–Russian energy 
agenda. 
Energy policy decisions have long-term implications and entail enormous costs. 
Complex decisions need to be made, while simultaneously – for an observer – it is not 
easy to evaluate these decisions and achievements. In order to make such an 
assessment, several energy policy-related concepts should first be defined properly, as 
they are more sophisticated and complex than commonly and conventionally perceived. 
Basically, they can be divided into three groups. The first group encompasses energy 
security, including security or insecurity of supply and demand. Different types of 
diversification represent the second group, while energy dependence, interdependence 
and independence belong to the third. For a net energy importer, the most important 
among these are security of supply and diversification. Therefore, in this paper, we first 
                                                 
1 In February 2015, the European Commission released a package of three communications on the EU’s 
Energy Union. One of them is the framework strategy for the Energy Union (European Commission, 2015). 
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present the concepts in general, and then concentrate on security of supply and gas 
diversification. On the one hand, we take a conventional approach to assessing the 
security of the supply of stationary fuels,2 and, on the other, we develop and use a 
scheme for understanding gas diversification in Hungary. These are presented through 
two case studies, illustrating how the theory is put into practice. And, finally, conclusions 
are drawn at the end of the paper. 
 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
2.1. Energy security 
Energy security has two sides. Although net energy importers tend to treat the terms 
energy security and security of supply as synonyms, security of supply constitutes only 
one aspect of energy security. The other side of this same coin is security of demand. 
While energy importers are concerned with security of supply, energy exporters aim to 
increase their security of demand. In many cases, however, exporters also import some 
energy, and, likewise, importers can also be exporters of energy. Hence, it is more 
precise to use the adjective “net”. There is relatively little academic and policy literature 
on energy security that deals with security of demand, and, due to certain inaccuracies, 
the term “energy security” is often used in the meaning of “security of supply”. It seems 
that we have to accept this inaccuracy. 
Security of supply and security of demand have no uniform definitions.3 There are 
different ways to approach security of supply (Table 1). Here, the traditionalists’ 
survival-based definitions are first to be mentioned. However, Buzan et al. (1998) warn 
that special care is needed when attempting to move the term security from a military 
context and to apply it to non-military issues, particularly to energy.4 Another approach 
is applicable if security of supply is considered as a concept that has different  
 
                                                 
2 Oil is not discussed here as it is principally a transportation fuel. 
3 In this paper, we focus on security of supply. Security of demand is only mentioned in relation to the 
potential Hungarian electricity exports resulting from Paks-2. 
4 Cited by Yafimava (2012: 12). 
- 4 - 
Csaba Weiner / Managing energy supply security and gas diversification in Hungary 
 
 
Table 1. A compilation of different definitions of security of supply 
1. Traditionalists’ survival-based definitions 
– Buzan et al. (1998) 
2. Dimensional classifications 
– two-dimensional definitions: availability and price (cost) 
   – Manners (1964), IEA (1985), UNDP (2000), Yergin (2006, 2011) 
– three- and multidimensional definitions 
   – Elkind (2010): availability, reliability, affordability and environmental sustainability 
   – APERC (2007): four ‘A’s: availability, accessibility, affordability and acceptability 
   – Sovacool and Mukherjee (2011): availability, affordability, technology development, sustainability  
      and regulation 
   – Alhajii (2007): economic, environmental, social, foreign policy, technical and security dimensions 
   – Wicks (2009): physical, price and geopolitical security 
   – Hippel et al. (2011): environment, technology, demand-side management, social-cultural factors and  
      international relations or military risks 
3. Other definitions 
– Cherp and Jewell (2011): three perspectives: sovereignty, robustness and resilience 
– Stirling (2007): system properties consisting of stability, durability, resilience and robustness 
Source: Own compilation. 
 
dimensions. The simplest and oldest definitions are two-dimensional, referring to 
availability and price. These two dimensions can also be called the physical and the 
economic dimensions (Cherp et al., 2012: 330) or physical and price security (Wicks, 
2009: 8). However, over time, many multidimensional definitions have emerged 
reflecting the different interests and energy-related challenges in various time periods. 
Sovacool (2011) identified 45 distinct definitions of the concept, though many of them 
are very similar to each other. This list remains incomplete and has definitely continued 
to expand since then. Nevertheless, many dimensions might overlap in one way or 
another. One such disputed matter, for example, is linked to whether geopolitical 
aspects or foreign policy considerations should be treated as a dimension of security of 
supply (APERC, 2007; Wicks, 2009; Hippel et al., 2011; EOP, 2014). Aside from the 
aforementioned, other possible definitions have also been proposed. For example, 
according to Cherp and Jewell (2011), security of supply has three perspectives – 
sovereignty, robustness and resilience. Sovereignty focuses on protection from potential 
threats from external agents, such as unfriendly political powers and overly powerful 
market agents. Robustness centres on resource sufficiency, infrastructure reliability, and 
stable and affordable prices. And, finally, resilience refers to the ability to withstand 
diverse disruptions. Sovereignty has its roots in political science, while robustness – in 
natural science and engineering, and resilience – in economics and complex system 
analysis. 
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When discussing security of supply, one would first need to know if it is interpreted 
in a narrow sense or in a wider one. The EU and the last Hungarian energy strategy from 
2011 interpret security of supply in a narrow sense. This means the EU, usually, does 
not consider the dimensions as part of the concept of security of supply, but as the main 
objectives of the EU’s energy policy. The three main objectives of the EU’s energy policy 
are security of supply, sustainability and competitiveness. We use the adverb “usually” 
because this has not always been the case. The European Commission (2000), in its 2000 
Green Paper, defined the objectives resulting from the concept of security of supply by 
stating that “the European Union’s long-term strategy for energy security of supply must 
be geared to ensuring, for the well-being of its citizens and the proper functioning of the 
economy, the uninterrupted physical availability of energy products on the market, at a 
price which is affordable for all consumers (private and industrial), while respecting 
environmental concerns and looking towards sustainable development”. In reference to 
the objective of competitiveness, the EU refers to an internal energy market that ensures 
competitive and affordable prices. Thus, in practice, affordability is also a clearly 
articulated, but not distinguished objective, though it is – unlike, for example, in the 
Commission’s 2006 Green Paper (see European Commission, 2006) – mentioned 
separately in the 2015 Energy Union framework strategy, when stating the aim of 
secure, sustainable, competitive, affordable energy for all EU consumers, both 
households and businesses (European Commission, 2015). 
In this paper, we apply the conventional three-dimensional approach, encompassing 
availability, affordability and sustainability, and consider security of supply in a wider 
sense. Decisions on security of supply and diversification are regarded as the 
consequences of choices among security of supply dimensions, in other words, the 
prioritisation of different dimensions. 
 
2.2. Gas diversification 
There are many types of diversification. We have developed a scheme of different 
Central and East European (CEE) diversification options for Russian gas imports (Figure 
1). Basically, diversification can be domestic or external. Possible domestic 
diversification options include reduced gas consumption, increased internal gas  
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Figure 1. A Central and East European diversification scheme for gas 
 
Source: Own compilation, partly based on Balmaceda (2008, 2013) and Stern (2002). An earlier version 
was published in Weiner (2016). 
 
production and sectoral diversification on the basis of fuels or energy produced 
domestically. External diversification comprises gas import source diversification, 
transit or route diversification and sectoral diversification based on imported fuels or 
energy. The aforementioned diversification options can be further broken down.  
One type of domestic diversification is reduced gas demand. Principally, this can be 
attained through either energy efficiency (e.g. new technologies, home insulation) or 
without increasing efficiency (energy conservation: changing behaviour and cutting 
back gas usage). Increasing gas prices affects both types of gas-saving options. 
Sectoral diversification, also called fuel mix, fuel type or energy-source 
diversification, supports efforts to move away from gas in the energy/electricity balance. 
As seen, sectoral diversification can be either domestic or external. This not only 
involves replacing gas with another primary energy (e.g. gas is substituted by coal, 
either domestic or imported, or imported nuclear fuel). If electricity, a secondary energy 
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source, is imported, then gas-powered electricity generation and thus gas consumption 
could also be reduced. However, if seen in the context of diversification away from 
Russia, then the sectoral diversification achievement is overshadowed by the fact that, 
for example, the coal imports are from Russia and the domestic nuclear power plant 
uses Russian technology or nuclear fuel, and is set up with Russian participation. 
One type of external diversification is gas import source diversification, which may be 
realized with or without geographical diversification. The former refers to other 
countries or regions and the latter to a more diverse contractual relationship with the 
actual exporting country, i.e. Russia. 
Geographical diversification can work not only without but also with Russian 
involvement. Regarding geographical diversification without Russian involvement, 
purchasing gas from a non-Russian supplier can occur either through physical or 
contractual diversification. In the case of contractual diversification, as compared to 
physical diversification, under normal (i.e. non-emergency) conditions, typically gas of 
Russian origin is delivered, although physical delivery from a non-Russian seller is in 
principle also possible. If Russian gas is not physically available, for example during a 
Russo–Ukrainian gas crisis, the contracted volumes will be delivered from other gas 
sources.5 This highlights that Russian gas plays an even greater role in CEE. 
Physical diversification can also be ensured with Russian involvement. In this case, 
the transaction is arranged through Russia, either in such a way that Russia serves 
simply as a transit country or Russia is involved in the transaction as more than a transit 
country. The first case cannot work because no free transit is provided through Russia. 
Thus, CEE consumers are also unable to buy gas directly from Central Asia transited 
through Russia. Direct supplies to Ukraine were stopped at the end of 2005. In order to 
purchase Central Asian gas, transit diversification avoiding Russia is necessary. The 
second case for physical diversification with Russian involvement includes two methods. 
One special method was used until the end of 2008. Certain CEE countries bought gas 
from Central Asia through intermediary companies at a cheaper price than offered by 
Gazprom. This gas was transited through Russia, and Russians played different roles in 
                                                 
5 Contractual diversification is used similarly to Stern (2002), but differently from Balmaceda (2008, 
2013). According to Balmaceda (2008, 2013), contractual diversification refers to a variety of contractual 
relationships, either in terms of companies or types of contracts (short-term, long-term, etc.) without 
geographical diversification. 
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the various available obscure ways of conducting these transactions. For example, gas 
was delivered through the controversial Russo–Ukrainian Rosukrenergo to Slovakia, 
Poland, Hungary and Romania. The second method is still operational and refers to re-
exports through a wholly-owned subsidiary of Gazprom. Gazprom Schweiz AG (formerly 
ZMB Schweiz AG) re-exports Central Asian gas to CEE (Weiner, 2016: 8).6 
Some sort of gas import source diversification could also be achieved without 
geographical diversification, either with non-Gazprom Russian sellers or with Gazprom. 
The first option is now quite limited, and restricted to Itera’s activities in the Baltics.7 
This is because, theoretically, buying piped gas from other Russian suppliers is not 
possible, as Gazprom holds almost exclusive rights to export pipeline gas from Russia. 
However, Gazprom’s almost exclusive rights to export liquefied natural gas (LNG) were 
partially revoked at the end of 2013. The second option for import source diversification 
without geographical diversification is when Gazprom has various types of contracts, 
either with more than one importer in the particular CEE country or with one importer 
but for different time horizons (short-, medium- and long-term). A few examples of the 
former can be found, but at most only one example of the latter is known in CEE.8 
Finally, there is transit or route diversification, which is generally supported by both 
CEE and Russia, but there are various views on how this should be implemented. 
Possible transit diversification options include other Western CIS transit states and 
transit-avoidance undersea pipelines. Russia prefers diversification of its transit routes 
to Europe via undersea pipelines bypassing Ukraine in order to reduce risks associated 
with Russo–Ukrainian disputes. 
The degree of complexity of CEE choices is high. Even within one country, there may 
be several choices as regards a type of diversification. It is no coincidence that EU 
Member States were provided with the possibility of deciding on how to achieve the 
                                                 
6 Naturally, it is impossible to distinguish between the gas molecules originating from Central Asia and 
those from Russia. 
7 Russia’s independent gas producer Itera Oil and Gas Company was acquired by Russia’s state-controlled 
Rosneft from Itera Holdings Limited (Cyprus). On the role of Itera, see Weiner (2016: 61). 
8 However, this is not a perfect example. The major Hungarian contract, which was to expire in 2015 but 
was instead extended (see below), has been divided. Thus, two contracts are effective until 2019 and two 
until 2021 (Gazprom, 2016). 
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binding infrastructure standard “N-1” rule of the EU Regulation No. 994/20109 
regarding security of supply. However, one needs to keep in mind that although 
diversification is seen as key to enhancing security of supply, it alone does not inevitably 
lead to achieving this goal. 
 
2.3. Energy dependence, interdependence and independence 
Energy dependence, interdependence and independence belong to the third and final 
group of concepts to be defined. Energy dependence is a natural feature. However, 
dependence of the consumer on the supplier is not a unilateral phenomenon, but rather 
a mutual one, i.e. interdependence. Interdependence can be either symmetric or 
asymmetric. Perceptions are important when evaluating interdependence. According to 
Palonkorpi (n.d.), energy dependency can be perceived either as a mutually beneficial 
interdependency (positive dependency) or an unequal and threatening dependency 
(negative dependency). A low energy dependency ratio with antagonistic relations with 
the exporter can be perceived as a serious threat to national security, while a higher 
ratio with cordial relations with the exporting country might not. Nevertheless, as seen, 
dependence has to be addressed, and it can be managed in various ways. Such an 
extreme case is self-sufficiency. According to the hard definition, energy or gas 
independence refers to independence from energy or gas imports (i.e. self-sufficiency) 
(Weiner, 2016). The soft definition suggests that the aim is to have import source 
diversity, in order to reduce reliance on unstable and unfriendly nations (Branko, 2012; 
Stelzer, 2009). By following our diversification scheme, self-sufficiency can also be 
interpreted as a result of diversification, for example as a consequence of increasing 
domestic production. As Cohen et al. (2011: 4860) outline, policymakers often equate 
the attainment of security of supply with the hard definition of energy independence. 
Nonetheless, as Bazilian et al. (2013) conclude, this aim can promote suboptimal policy 
choices. 
                                                 
9 The aim is that in the event of an outage of the single largest gas supply infrastructure, the remaining 
infrastructure should be sufficient to satisfy total gas demand for an entire day of exceptionally high gas 
demand (occurring with a statistical probability of once in 20 years). 
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3. Case studies: putting the theory into practice 
 
3.1. Case study 1: security of supply in Hungary 
Since the change of regime, Hungary has had three energy strategies. The first was 
approved in 1993 and remained valid for one and a half decades. Approved in 2008, the 
second energy strategy, for the 2008–2020 period, was short-lived compared to the first 
one. The third, Hungary’s National Energy Strategy 2030 (with an outlook to 2050), was 
approved in 2011, one year after the new government took office (NES-2030, 2011).10 
The 2011 energy strategy has two primary goals, i.e. increasing direct state presence 
and economic development based on cheap nuclear energy (Felsmann, 2011). Among 
the six scenarios for Hungary’s electricity mix by 2030 and 2050, the government chose 
the so-called Nuclear–Coal–Green concept, referring to new units at the existing nuclear 
power plant at Paks, a new coal power plant and the utilisation of renewables as a linear 
extension of the planned trajectory set in 2010 in Hungary’s National Renewable Energy 
Utilisation Action Plan for 2010–2020. However, the energy strategy claims that this 
does not mean that the elements of the other scenarios are unrealistic. This, to some 
extent, contradicts the government’s statement that Paks-2 is indispensable, as two of 
the above-mentioned six scenarios are opposed to further nuclear expansion.11 
 
Nuclear energy. Currently, more than half of Hungary’s electricity is generated by 
Paks. The role of gas in electricity production has drastically dropped, while the role of 
nuclear power has increased, with coal preceding gas. Of the gross electricity generated 
in 2015, gas accounted for 17 per cent, coal 20 per cent and nuclear 52 per cent (Table 
2). The Paks Nuclear Power Plant and the lignite-fired Mátra Power Plant provide the 
bulk of electricity generation, and operate at high utilization rates.12 These 
developments are typically due to market factors, primarily the relatively high price of 
gas as compared to cheap coal and electricity, as well as low carbon prices.  
 
                                                 
10 In 2015, the strategy’s energy consumption projections were recalculated. 
11 The government taking office in 2010 seemed to focus on nuclear energy from the very beginning. 
12 In contrast, in the mid-2010s, the average capacity utilisation rate for the power plants in Hungary was 
around 40 per cent (Mavir, 2016). 
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Table 2. Gross electricity and heat production in Hungary, by fuels, 2006–2015 (%) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Electricity 
Nuclear  37.5 36.7 37.0 43.0 42.2 43.5 45.6 50.7 53.2 52.2 
Coal and coal products  19.8 18.7 18.0 17.9 17.0 18.3 18.7 21.1 20.8 19.5 
Natural gas  36.7 38.1 37.9 29.0 31.0 29.8 27.1 18.3 14.4 16.8 
Oil products  1.5 1.3 0.9 1.8 1.3 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Other combustible fuels*  0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 
Biomass (solid biofuels) 3.2 3.4 4.4 5.9 5.4 4.2 3.8 4.7 5.8 5.5 
Biogases 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.0 
Renewable municipal waste 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 
Hydro 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.0 0.8 
Wind  0.1 0.3 0.5 0.9 1.4 1.7 2.2 2.4 2.2 2.3 
Solar  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Heat 
Nuclear  1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.6 1.5 
Coal and coal products  16.0 18.1 17.0 12.5 13.2 14.3 13.5 10.7 10.8 10.6 
Natural gas  78.9 77.4 77.3 77.3 78.3 76.1 77.4 75.1 71.6 69.5 
Oil products  1.4 0.2 0.9 4.6 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.6 
Other combustible fuels* 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.9 4.7 4.7 
Biomass (solid biofuels) 0.8 1.3 1.5 2.2 4.5 5.3 5.0 7.8 7.2 8.5 
Biogases 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Renewable municipal waste 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.9 
Solar 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Geothermal 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.2 2.4 3.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
* Other combustible fuels = industrial waste + non-renewable municipal waste + other sources. 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat (2017e, 2017f) and MEKH (2017a, 2017b). 
 
Under these circumstances, the share of net imports in total electricity consumption has 
increased and has been above 30 per cent since 2014 (Table 3) (MEKH–Mavir, 2015, 
2016; Mavir, 2016; MEKH, 2017a; Eurostat, 2017e). Regarding security of supply, 
increased electricity imports are advantageous from the perspective of both 
affordability and environmental sustainability,13 but the government sees them as a risk 
in terms of availability, especially if the share of net electricity imports continues to 
grow in the future. Seemingly, the government considers electricity to be a special 
commodity, which should not be threatened by problems with electricity imports. Thus, 
electricity supply should not be dependent on imports that may be cut in a crisis 
situation. Therefore, the government believes Hungary should be able to satisfy its 
electricity demand through domestic production. This means Hungary is developing its 
ability to achieve electricity self-sufficiency. This is an energy policy decision, in which  
 
                                                 
13 Naturally, this is only true if we do not take into account imported electricity generated by polluting 
power plants. 
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Table 3. Electricity balance of Hungary, 2006–2015 (GWh) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Imports 15 393 14 680 12 774 10 972 9 897 14 664 16 970 16 635 19 079 19 935 
Exports 8 186 10 694 8 871 5 459 4 702 8 021 9 003 4 758 5 689 6 249 
Net imports 7 207 3 986 3 903 5 513 5 195 6 643 7 967 11 877 13 390 13 686 
Total gross production 35 859 39 960 40 025 35 908 37 371 36 019 34 635 30 294 29 392 30 342 
Total net production* 33 345 37 220 37 383 33 344 34 613 33 533 32 351 28 031 27 131 28 132 
Available for final 
consumption 
33 240 33 744 34 327 33 150 34 207 34 574 35 238 34 877 35 728 36 975 
Final consumption 33 238 33 744 34 327 33 150 34 207 34 540 35 004 34 873 34 737 36 193 
Total consumption** 43 066 43 946 43 928 41 421 42 566 42 662 42 602 42 171 42 782 44 028 
Net imports/total cons. 
(%) 
16.7 9.1 8.9 13.3 12.2 15.6 18.7 28.2 31.3 31.1 
* Total net production = total gross production – own consumption of power plants. 
** Total consumption = net imports + total gross production. 
Source: Eurostat (2017e) and own calculations. 
 
priority is given to the availability dimension. The government insists that the only 
plausible solution for this is the Paks-2 project. The two new units are expected to be 
commissioned in the second half of the 2020s, with a slightly higher combined capacity 
(two units of 1200 MW each) than that of the four old units (four units of 500MW 
each).14 The four old units shall be phased out in the 2030s. The new nuclear units will 
be owned by the Hungarian state and are planned to cost around EUR 12.5 billion, 
accounting for more than 12 per cent of the Hungarian GDP. The Russian budget will 
provide a EUR 10-billion credit line for the project, and Russia’s state-owned 
Vnesheconombank (VEB) will act as an agent for the Russian government. Previous 
forecasts indicated that with Paks-2, Hungary would become a net exporter of electricity 
(REKK, 2011), thus security of demand, i.e. a market for excess electricity, would also 
have to be ensured. However, recent forecasts show that Hungary will likely remain a 
net importer on a yearly basis (Table 4) (ENTSO-E, 2015). Nonetheless, security of 
demand is still a challenge for shorter time periods. Regarding the availability 
dimension, the government contends Paks-2 will also increase security of supply, as 
nuclear fuel will be available in sufficient quantities at the site. But there is no possibility 
of diversification of nuclear fuel for this type of reactors. Regarding affordability, the 
government promises cheap electricity from Paks-2. For the project to pay off, a 
substantial price increase is needed in Europe. The government anticipates that because 
of the investment gap in the electricity generation sector under cheap electricity,  
 
                                                 
14 The 2011 energy strategy suggested two 1000 MW units each. 
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Table 4. Electricity production and demand scenarios for Hungary, by fuels, in 2020 and 2030 
 Biofuels Gas Hard 
coal 
Hydro, 
other 
storage 
Lignite Nuclear Oil Other 
non-RES 
Other 
RES 
Solar Wind Total Demand 
2020 “Expected Progress” 
ICAP 223 3 794 0 56 849 1 892 407 850 500 60 750 9 381  
AGEN 1 423 932 0 248 6 081 13 322 0 3 835 2 256 79 1 616 29 792 43 480 
2030 Vision 1: “Slow Progress” 
ICAP 210 4 185 0 56 470 4 108 407 720 550 60 750 11 516  
AGEN 1 337 1 944 0 248 3 458 28 701 0 3 249 2 482 79 1 616 43 114 48 000 
2030 Vision 2: “Money Rules” 
ICAP 210 2 980 0 56 470 4 108 407 720 550 60 750 10 311  
AGEN 1 201 420 0 248 3 323 28 765 0 3 249 2 482 79 1 616 41 383 45 738 
2030 Vision 3: “Green Transition” 
ICAP 210 4 977 0 100 0 3 000 407 720 1 040 200 1 000 11 654  
AGEN 1 305 8 467 0 445 0 20 886 0 3 249 4 692 265 2 154 41 463 44 785 
2030 Vision 4: “Green Revolution” 
ICAP 210 4 977 0 100 0 3 000 407 720 1 040 339 7 114 17 907  
AGEN 1 417 10 207 0 445 0 21 023 0 3 249 4 692 449 15 326 56 808 48 336 
RES – renewables. ICAP – installed capacities (MW). AGEN – annual generation (GWh). 
Note: Grey cells indicate the scenario in which annual demand is lower than generation. 
Source: ENTSO-E (2015). 
 
European electricity prices will rise by enough, and will be higher than Paks-2 electricity 
prices. In contrast, others warn that electricity from Paks-2 will not be cheap and such 
long-term price growth in the European market is unlikely to be observed. Price 
increases of such magnitude would provide incentives for innovations in other energy-
generation technologies and energy efficiency, and thus ultimately leading to lower 
prices (Felsmann, 2015). Finally, regarding the sustainability dimension, nuclear energy 
contributes a very small amount of emissions to the atmosphere. Nonetheless, handling 
nuclear waste remains a challenge. 
The 2014 decision on Paks-2 was unexpected and early. This might turn out to be 
disadvantageous due to a lack of knowledge on how markets for renewables will 
develop, and as nuclear energy innovation could also significantly lower investment and 
operating costs (Felsmann, 2015). The 2011 Hungarian energy strategy considers the 
construction of new nuclear capacities at a new site after the shutdown of the four old 
units. At the beginning of October 2017, the minister in charge of Paks-2 made the first 
references to the possibility of building these new units. According to this information, 
the construction of two new Paks-2 units will start in 2020 (Kormany.hu, 2017). 
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Renewables. Seemingly, the Hungarian government does not believe that renewables 
will have a powerful role to play. Obviously, the government views renewables more as 
a problem than an opportunity. This seems to stem from the need for subsidies to 
develop this energy option and due to it being a challenge for the transmission system 
operator. However, the flexibility in power grids is often underestimated and the 
question of subsidies should be seen in light of sizeable state aid for the Paks-2 project. 
Based on the newest statistics, at first glance, the share of renewables looks favourable 
(Table 5). The target share of renewables in gross final energy consumption has been 
achieved, but only because of a very recent change in the statistical methodology 
pertaining to wood biomass, the largest renewable source in Hungary (REKK, 2017).15 
With this change, the main incentive for increasing the role of renewables has gone, 
while with the exception of solid biomass, mostly wood biomass, renewables continue to 
perform a minor role in Hungary. Meanwhile, the political environment for renewables 
has remained a big challenge in the country. A couple of disadvantageous changes have 
recently occurred, including the introduction of a fee on solar photovoltaic panels and a 
de facto ban on new wind projects, with no new permits having been issued since 2006. 
The government claims wind is not optimal for Hungary and thus wind energy has no 
place in the Hungarian energy system (Német, 2016). Although limited, hydropower 
opportunities exist in Hungary, but larger-scale projects have been politically 
unacceptable since the Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Dam issue on the Danube. 
With Paks-2, the Hungarian government has also made a decision in favour of 
centralised energy production and thus against decentralised, local energy. 
Nevertheless, according to the calculations of Felsmann (2016), nuclear energy and 
renewables can co-exist in Hungary. As widely known, renewables have the lowest 
variable costs, followed by nuclear energy, and then comes coal, while gas-fired units 
have the highest variable costs (Székffy, 2014: 723). This means that if one commits to  
 
                                                 
15 When the national energy regulator moved from using supply-side statistics to being based on statistics 
of household energy consumption, the figures drastically increased. The 2014 share of renewables in 
gross final energy consumption increased from 9.5 per cent to 14.6 per cent (Eurostat, 2016a). It reached 
14.5 per cent in 2015, and since 2011, it has been above the 2020 target value of 13 per cent, specified by 
the 2009 Renewable Energy Directive of the European Parliament and Council (European Parliament and 
Council, 2009), though Hungary’s National Renewable Energy Utilisation Action Plan for 2010–2020 sets a 
target of 14.65 per cent by 2020 (NFM, 2010). The other target, namely the 10 per cent share of 
renewables in the transport sector by 2020 still needs to be reached. The share of solid biomass in 
renewable energy consumption was slightly above 82 per cent in 2014 and 2015 (MEKH, 2017c). 
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Table 5. Share of energy from renewable sources in Hungary, 2006–2015 (%) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Share of energy from renewables in 
gross final energy consumption 
5.1 5.9 6.5 8.0 12.8 14.0 15.5 16.2 14.6 14.5 
Share of electricity from renewables in 
gross electricity consumption 
3.5 4.2 5.3 7.0 7.1 6.4 6.1 6.6 7.3 7.3 
Share of renewables in heating and 
cooling 
7.5 8.9 8.3 10.5 18.1 20.1 23.3 23.7 21.2 21.3 
Share of renewables in transport 1.1 1.5 5.1 5.7 6.0 6.0 5.9 6.2 6.9 6.2 
Source: Eurostat (2016b, 2017c). 
 
power generation units with low variable costs, then once these capacities have been 
built up, intentions exist for the units to be operated in any case. This approach in turn 
has a serious impact on other energy sources already in use or for which there are plans 
that they will be used in electricity generation – while significant changes may occur in 
the energy markets. 
 
Coal. Coal is the energy source for which the dimensions of availability and 
environmental acceptability or sustainability strongly collide with each other. Coal held 
a prominent position in the national energy policy discourse in the 1990s because of 
coal-fired power plants and coal mines. However, currently, there are only three power 
stations in Hungary that burn or can also burn coal.16 Among them, based on its two 
lignite mines, the lignite-fired Mátra Power Plant is of great importance, also holding a 
significant employment position in the region (Mert.hu, n.d.).17 The power plant has 
been controlled by German owners since its privatization, while the government 
through Hungary’s state-owned energy group MVM acts as a minority shareholder. 
However, the power plant’s current licenses will expire by 2025. The 2011 energy 
strategy gives two reasons why coal-based energy production should be maintained in 
Hungary: (1) in case of an energy crisis (e.g. gas price explosion, nuclear disruption), 
coal is the only internal reserve which could be rapidly mobilized;18 and (2) to prevent 
losing the professional culture of such energy production, which might be necessary in  
 
                                                 
16 Hungary’s 2015 coal and coal product balance sheet can be seen in Table 6. 
17 The two other power plants are Ajka Power Plant in the city of Ajka and the power plant belonging to 
Hamburger Hungaria, a leading corrugated base paper manufacturer in the city of Dunaújváros. 
18 According to Hungary’s 2013 Reserve Management and Utilisation Action Plan, the amount of primary 
energy currently available from domestic coal can practically be doubled (NFM, 2013: 6). 
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Table 6. Hungary’s coal and coal product balance in 2015 
 Primary coal products Secondary coal products Manufactured 
gases 
Coking 
coal 
Other 
bituminous 
coal 
Sub- 
bituminous 
coal 
Lignite Patent 
Fuel 
Coke- 
oven 
coke 
Coal 
tar 
Brown 
coal 
briquettes 
Coke- 
oven 
gas 
Blast 
furnace 
gas  
thousand tonnes TJ 
Production 0 0 0 9 261 0 960 46 0 9 182 7 607 
Imports 1 310 63 161 63 0 34 14 4 0 0 
Exports 0 0 0 355 0 298 46 0 0 0 
Stock changes 17 -7 -1 193 0 3 1 0 0 0 
Total dom. cons. 1 327 56 160 9 162 0 699 15 4 9 182 7 607 
Source: MEKH (2017d).  
 
an emergency, and because of the possibility of greater use of coal in the future if 
sustainability and emission criteria (carbon capture and storage, as well as clean coal 
technologies) are met (NES-2030, 2011). Analysing the medium- and long-term supply 
capacity development up to 2031, the Hungarian electricity transmission system 
operator Mavir, an MVM subsidiary, argued in 2016 that coal power plants would almost 
completely disappear in Hungary. Coal may only play a role post-2031, due to the 
availability of technologies mentioned in the 2011 energy strategy (Mavir, 2016). 
 
3.2. Case study 2: Hungary’s gas diversification 
Since the Russian–Ukrainian gas crisis of January 2009, Hungary’s dependence on 
both gas in general and Russian gas in specific has decreased, while Hungary’s gas 
security has increased (Table 7). This has involved the wide availability of large-scale 
cheaper gas imports from Western Europe, constructions of new gas interconnections 
with neighbouring countries and sharply decreasing domestic gas consumption.19 
However, decreasing gas demand has partly been offset by growing electricity imports, 
and as indicated, the role of nuclear power has increased. In residential heating, many 
people have turned to firewood and coal, with consequences for the dimension of 
environmental acceptability. In contrast, domestic gas production has declined, large gas  
 
                                                 
19 Underground gas storages also play an important role in security of supply, but they are not regarded as 
diversification. Hungary is a great power in the field of gas storage. After the 2006 Russo–Ukrainian gas 
crisis, Hungary also set up a strategic storage facility. Meanwhile, all the facilities have become state-
owned. Nonetheless, there was a time when storages did not hold satisfactory quantities of gas, which was 
risky and thus reduced security of supply. 
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Table 7. Hungary’s gas balance, 2006–2015 (TJ) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Primary 
production 
99 734 83 926 83 981 95 764 93 570 88 562 74 027 64 656 60 177 57 319 
Imports 394 454 358 995 390 442 331 059 331 283 276 281 282 398 283 348 311 343 237 669 
Exports 185 716 787 2 955 7 801 19 495 28 915 50 703 25 860 19 184 
Stock changes -14 330 5 985 -31 475 -40 697 -6 097 46 282 23 216 25 253 -53 354 37 817 
Gross inland 
consumption 
479 672 448 190 442 161 383 171 410 955 391 630 350 726 322 554 292 306 313 622 
Source: Eurostat (2017d). 
 
pipeline projects, either aimed at transit avoidance or source diversification, have failed, 
and two of Hungary’s neighbours, Croatia and Romania, have not fulfilled their 
obligations regarding the joint gas interconnections. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
regasification plans in neighbouring countries (in Croatia and Romania) have also 
remained on paper. 
Following the completed gas interconnectors with Romania and Croatia, another one 
linking Slovakia and Hungary was also launched, but in line with preliminary 
expectations, there is no demand for it, and thus it is not in use. However, due to 
increased interest, the capacity of the western (Austrian) entry point was expanded. For 
the first time in 2011 and then in 2012 (but not in subsequent years), Hungary imported 
more gas through the western entry point than through the eastern (Ukrainian) one, 
though Gazprom supplies gas from both directions. 
On the Southern Gas Corridor, the Nabucco West pipeline project, a scaled-down 
version of Nabucco “classic”, based on Azeri gas and aimed at geographical 
diversification without Russian involvement by transporting gas from the Turkish–
Bulgarian border through Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary into Austria, was shelved in 
June 2013. In turn, South Stream, essentially a transit diversification project running 
under the Black Sea to Bulgaria and then onwards, was terminated in December 2014.20 
Initially, the Tesla pipeline, to be laid down from the Turkish–Greek border through 
Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary to Austria, was proposed as the continuation of 
the TurkStream pipeline project, stretching from Russia to Turkey across the Black Sea. 
However, recently, a Bulgarian–Serbian–Hungarian pipeline has been put on the agenda. 
But any such plan would face similar EU regulatory challenges experienced by South 
                                                 
20 Although Hungary actively supported South Stream, it was also among those Central and East European 
countries that in March 2016 signed a letter objecting to Nord Stream-2, a trans-Baltic Sea pipeline project 
between Russia and Germany, aimed at diverting gas from the Ukrainian gas corridor. 
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Stream if it ever entered the project phase. As a result of so many disappointing projects, 
enthusiasm for large-scale pipeline plans remains rather low in Hungary. Any 
announcements pertaining to this effect should be regarded with caution. 
Currently, Hungary has two long-term gas import contracts, both of them with 
Gazprom Export, Gazprom’s export arm. The major one is with MVM’s Hungarian Gas 
Trade (formerly Mol Natural Gas Supply and then E.ON Natural Gas Trade), Hungary’s 
leading gas trader through Panrusgáz, the Russian–Hungarian gas intermediary joint 
venture.21 This contract was signed by Hungarian oil and gas company Mol.22 Concluded 
in 2007 for the period 2008–2028, the small contract has been entered into with 
Centrex Hungary, an affiliate of the Gazprombank-owned and Vienna-based Centrex 
Europe Energy & Gas AG.23 Although the major long-term gas supply contract was to 
expire in 2015, unused gas will be available until 2021.24 The Hungarian government 
intends to sign a new long-term gas supply contract with Gazprom for post-2021. 
Non-Russian gas supplies were commenced in the 1990s. These supplies included – 
on the one hand – those from Germany’s Ruhrgas (later E.ON Ruhrgas, then E.ON Global 
Commodities, now Uniper Global Commodities) and the French Gaz de France (later GDF 
Suez, now Engie), and those from Ukraine and then from Central Asia, on the other.25 
The contract with GDF expired in 2012, while the contract with E.ON Ruhrgas was 
successfully terminated well before the 2015 expiration date. Thus, these contracts were 
not handed over in 2013 when MVM bought E.ON Natural Gas Trade. It is true that as 
contractual diversification and not physical, gas was not physically delivered to Hungary 
from Germany and France via Austria. Moreover, gas with western contracts was more 
expensive than that with Russian ones. However, the benefits of the western contracts 
were observable during the January 2009 gas crisis, when this scheme worked well and 
Hungarian (and other foreign) consumers benefitted from this possibility. As mentioned 
above, Central Asian imports via gas intermediaries were stopped at the end of 2008. 
                                                 
21 With this contract, Gazprom Export sells gas not only from the eastern direction but also from the 
western direction via Slovakia and Austria. 
22 Mol’s wholesale, marketing and trading business Mol Natural Gas Supply was taken over by Germany’s 
E.ON Ruhrgas in the mid-2000s. E.ON Natural Gas Trade, the new name of Mol Natural Gas Supply, was 
subsequently acquired by MVM in 2013. E.ON Natural Gas Trade was renamed Hungarian Gas Trade. 
23 Gazprom has not had control over Gazprombank for many years. 
24 As noted above, the Panrusgáz contract was divided. As a consequence, Gazprom and Panrusgáz 
currently have four contracts (Gazprom, 2016). 
25 There was no need for these quantities, especially at such high prices. 
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However, Gazprom Schweiz AG, exporting Central Asian gas to Central and Eastern 
Europe, is present in Hungary through its Hungarian subsidiary WIEE Hungary. 
While steps have been taken towards increasing the physical availability of gas, there 
has been a shift in domestic energy policy towards the affordability dimension, reflected 
in a major utility rate cut campaign. Affordability considerations contributed to the 
politically-driven regulatory squeeze on the profitability of the utility sectors and on the 
partial renationalization at the corporate level. This shift was to some extent imminent 
in most of the region’s countries (Table 8) (Deák and Weiner, 2016). For large segments 
of society, the duly payment of gas and electricity bills has been an everyday challenge. 
Utility prices belong to the top issues on people’s minds. The government cut regulated 
gas prices when they still were not justified by the Russian long-term contract gas 
prices.26 The latter have only recently become competitive with gas prices based on gas-
on-gas competition (market-based gas prices), partly due to Russian discounts and 
partly because of the decline in oil prices. However, the recent drop in contract gas 
prices has not been reflected in domestic regulated gas prices. Without Gazprom’s 
concessions on gas volumes and prices, the government’s utility rate cut would have 
been hardly sustainable even in the medium run (Deák and Weiner, 2016). However, 
these concessions are overshadowed by having been negotiated as part of a package 
deal related to Paks-2, if this is in fact what happened. On the other hand, utility rate cuts 
have weakened security of supply because of the lack of investments (LaBelle and 
Georgiev, 2016), and also because decreasing energy prices for households have had a 
positive impact on energy use in Hungary (Sebestyén Szép, 2017). 
 
Table 8. The share of gas, electricity and other liquid and solid fuels in household spending in the Visegrad 
countries and the EU, 2006–2015 (%) 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
EU28 3.9 3.7 4.2 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.6 4.7 4.2 4.1 
EU15 3.7 3.5 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.4 4.4 3.9 3.9 
Czech Republic 7.4 7.3 7.4 8.1 8.3 8.1 8.4 8.6 7.5 7.4 
Hungary 5.3 5.7 6.5 7.2 7.5 7.5 7.4 6.7 5.3 5.1 
Poland 7.9 7.2 7.6 8.0 8.6 9.0 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.5 
Slovakia 11.7 11.0 10.4 10.7 10.5 10.8 11.2 11.1 10.9 10.6 
Note: Dark grey cells indicate years affected by the government-introduced utility rate cuts in Hungary. 
Source: Eurostat (2017b). 
                                                 
26 We do not know how important a role oil product prices are now playing in gas pricing, though it has 
surely decreased drastically. 
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4. Summary and conclusions 
 
The EU countries, including the EU-member CEE countries, have very different 
conditions, various priorities, and their energy policies therefore differ. We find that 
there is no universally optimal choice or mix for enhancing security of supply and gas 
diversification. There are only different sets of choices and a large variation in the 
influencing factors that impact the prioritisation of different security of supply 
dimensions, with uncertain and different rewards both in the short and long term. 
Paks-2 represents an unexpected turn as regards Hungary’s energy dependence. With 
Paks-2, Hungary’s dependence will both decrease and increase – as new types of risks 
appear. The Paks-2 decision happened at a time when Hungary was following a 
decreasing trajectory for its energy dependence, notwithstanding certain negative 
developments. The decision was surprising despite preceding references in the 2011 
energy strategy. One would expect a very different process when making decisions for 
many decades ahead. Nonetheless, this was still a legitimate decision that also won EU 
approval. Paks-2 can be understood as a form of sectoral diversification, and it has its 
own place in our gas diversification scheme. 
However, despite the decision on Paks-2, there is great uncertainty about Hungary’s 
energy policy and security of supply. It remains unclear what the future role of coal, gas 
and renewables in the energy/electricity mix is to be. Their future might be mainly 
dependent on purely political decisions rather than energy market factors. Among these 
questions, the future of the Russian (major) long-term gas supply contract is of 
particular importance. Gazprom has practically extended it until 2021, which is not only 
economically significant for Hungary, but has also provided the Hungarian government 
with more time prior to signing a new contract, which could take into account both the 
progress made in gas diversification and the latest developments in the gas markets. 
Regarding coal (lignite), so far no decision has been made to introduce a new unit. As for 
renewables, solar energy will certainly squeeze profitability rates in the electricity 
generation sector. Recently, permits have been requested for the installation of large 
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volumes of solar plants.27 The question is how much of these capacities will be realised. 
Present electricity prices do not support any type of power plants (Szalai, 2017). 
However, there is always a lot of uncertainty in the energy markets, and thus every 
decision carries with it certain risks. 
                                                 
27 However, stricter award criteria from 2017 onwards played a major role in a large number of requests 
submitted for authorization (Mohos, 2017). 
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